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BiosafetyChanging the nature, kind and quantity of particular regulatory-RNA molecules through genetic engineering
can create biosafety risks. While some genetically modiﬁed organisms (GMOs) are intended to produce new
regulatory-RNA molecules, these may also arise in other GMOs not intended to express them. To characterise,
assess and then mitigate the potential adverse effects arising from changes to RNA requires changing current
approaches to food or environmental risk assessments of GMOs. We document risk assessment advice offered
to government regulators in Australia, New Zealand and Brazil during ofﬁcial risk evaluations of GM plants for
use as human food or for release into the environment (whether for ﬁeld trials or commercial release),
how the regulator considered those risks, and what that experience teaches us about the GMO risk assess-
ment framework. We also suggest improvements to the process.
© 2013 Elsevier Ltd. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.1. Introduction
All commercialized genetically modiﬁed (GM) plants are currently
created through in vitro DNA modiﬁcation. Most are designed to create
a new protein. However, a growing minority are designed to change
their RNA content in order to regulate gene expression (Table 1). This
is because RNA, speciﬁcally double-stranded RNA (dsRNA), is now
known to be an important regulator of gene expression (Appendix 1
of Heinemann, 2009). In fact, in the future, GM products are likely to
arise from only in vitro RNA modiﬁcation rather than from in vitro
DNA modiﬁcation (Heinemann, 2009).
RNA is an intermediatemolecule used in cellular reactions of protein
synthesis. The most familiar form of RNA is mRNA, the single-stranded
messenger. However, it is only just over a decade since the biochemistry
of small dsRNA molecule has begun to be studied. This form can func-
tion as a gene regulator (Hutvágner and Simard, 2008).
dsRNAs include siRNA (short-inhibitory RNA), miRNA (microRNA),
shRNA (short-hairpin RNA) and so on and are foundation substrates
in biochemical pathways that cause RNAi (RNA interference), PTGS
(co-suppression, post-transcriptional gene silencing) and TGS (tran-
scriptional gene silencing). In short, RNAi, PTGS and TGS are what
occur when the connection between genes and the production of the
proteins speciﬁed by genes is disrupted.ces, University of Canterbury,
.A. Heinemann).
-ND license.dsRNAs form when both strands of a DNA molecule are transcribed
to synthesize complementary RNAmolecules (which then bind together
in the same way as strands of DNA), or when stretches of intra-
molecular complementarity create stem-loop structures. A long dsRNA
molecule (e.g., pre-mature miRNA) is processed into a shorter dsRNA
(e.g., miRNA) and then one strand is retained – the guide strand – to
direct protein complexes to target mRNA molecules and prevent their
translation (cytoplasmic pathways), or to target and chemically modify
DNA sequences by addition of methyl groups and cause modiﬁcation of
DNA-associated histone proteins (the nuclear pathway). The nuclear
pathway is known to inhibit transcription and to seed heterochromatin
formation (Ahlenstiel et al., 2012; Grewal and Elgin, 2007; Reyes-Turcu
and Grewal, 2012; Zhang and Zhu, 2012).
Once a silencing effect is initiated, the effect may be inherited. The
biochemistry of this process varies depending on the organism and
remains an area of active research with many unknown aspects. Nev-
ertheless, it is known for example that human cells can maintain the
modiﬁcations necessary for TGS, creating actual or potential epigenetic
inheritance within tissues and organisms (Hawkins et al., 2009). In
some cases the dsRNA pathways induce RNA-dependent DNAmethyla-
tion and chromatin changes (TGS) that persist through reproduction or
cell division, and in other cases the cytoplasmic pathways remain active
in descendents (Cogoni and Macino, 2000).
Unintended gene silencing is a common outcome of the genetic
engineering process. Indeed, most cells initially engineered using
in vitro nucleic acid techniques ultimately “silence” the gene inserted
because of the engineering-associated production of dsRNA (Carthew
Table 1
Various GM crops with intended RNA changes in the food approval pipeline.
Product Status Ref/application code
Flavr Savr Tomato Withdrawn from market (Sanders and Hiatt, 2005)
High oleic acid soybean lines G94-1, G94-19 and G168b FSANZa approved (2000) withdrawn from market A387
New Leaf Y and new leaf plus potatoesc FSANZ approved (2001) withdrawn from production A383 and A384
High oleic acid soybean line DP-305423-1 FSANZ approved (2010) A1018
Herbicide-tolerant, high oleic acid soybean line MON87705 FSANZ approved (2011) A1049
Golden mosaic virus resistant pinto bean Brazil approved (2011) (Tollefson, 2011)
papaya ringspot virus resistant papaya USA (1996), Canada (2003) and Japan (2011) USDAd
GMO Compasse
altered grain starch wheat OGTRa approved for ﬁeld trials and human feeding study (2009) DIR093f
a Food Standards Australia/New Zealand (FSANZ) http://www.foodstandards.gov.au/consumerinformation/gmfoods/gmcurrentapplication1030.cfm; Ofﬁce of the Gene Technology
Regulator (OGTR, Australia).
b “Withdrawn from [FSANZ] Standard 1.5.2 in 2011 because never commercialized.”
c The way the virus protein gene used as a transgene causes resistance to the potato viruses (Y and PLRV) was unknown at time of approval. However, it is well known now that gene
duplications (which occur when the virus infects the GM plant) cause silencing of both copies of the gene through RNAi.
d http://gain.fas.usda.gov/Recent%20GAIN%20Publications/Japan%20approved%20GM%20papaya_Tokyo_Japan_12-19-2011.pdf.
e http://www.gmo-compass.org/eng/database/plants/59.papaya.html.
f http://www.ogtr.gov.au/internet/ogtr/publishing.nsf/content/dir093.
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RNA sequence may be created when the DNA strand that is not nor-
mally used as a co-factor (or “template”) for transcription is used
as such. The resulting single-stranded RNA may bind to the target
mRNA to create regions of linear dsRNA that can be processed into
siRNA (Fig. 1). Another possibility is that the insert contributes to
the formation of a stem-loop, fromwhich the “stem”may be processed
into an miRNA-like molecule (Fig. 1).
dsRNAs are remarkably stable in the environment; a property per-
haps overlooked based on the relative instability of single stranded
species of RNA (Parrott et al., 2010). Insects and worms that feed on
plants that make dsRNA can take in the dsRNA through their digestive
system, where it remains intact (Gordon and Waterhouse, 2007; Mao
et al., 2007). RNAi has been induced through oral exposure in several
insect pests (Chen et al., 2010; Whyard et al., 2009) and oral exposure
to dsRNA has been shown to reduce the lethal effects of the IsraeliFig. 1. Source of new dsRNA molecules from genetic engineering. (A) DNA inserted (dashe
genetic engineering creates new sequences regardless of the source of the DNA. The DNA u
and solid lines) by different sequences than in the source genome or it may be sourced fro
RNA molecules (red and dashed blue and green lines) that might be able to form dsRNA b
structures to form (base-pairing illustrated with thin black connecting lines). (D) This may
silencing in the GMO or in organisms that eat the GMO.Acute Paralysis Virus on honey bees (Maori et al., 2009). Worms can
absorb dsRNA through their skin when dsRNA is suspended in liquid
(Cogoni and Macino, 2000; Tabara et al., 1998). Once taken up, the
dsRNA can circulate throughout the body and alter gene expression
in the animal (Mello and Conte, 2004). In some cases, the dsRNA
taken up is further ampliﬁed or causes a secondary reaction that leads
tomore anddifferent dsRNAs (“secondary” dsRNAs)with unpredictable
targets (Baum et al., 2007; Gordon and Waterhouse, 2007). They also
readily transfer to mammals through food where they can circulate in
blood and alter gene expression in organs (Hirschi, 2012; Zhang et al.,
2012a).
The stability and transmissibility of dsRNAs suggest the potential
for existence of exposure routes that are relevant to human and envi-
ronmental risk assessments of genetically engineered/modiﬁed (GM)
organisms. As the great majority of existing GMOs in the environ-
ment or human food have been modiﬁed to introduce one or mored blue and green lines in the black double stranded DNA molecule) into a genome by
sed will create new sequences because it will be bordered (boundary between dashed
m a genome that has no or few sequence matches. (B) Transcription will produce new
ecause of complementarity or (C) because of internal base-pairing causing stem-loop
lead to intended and unintended off-target (red line with purple target section) gene
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on the risks speciﬁc to GMOs that introduce a new dsRNA, much less
the development and testing of validated safety assurance procedures
speciﬁc to dsRNA. The topic is gaining attention as evidenced by recent
conferences and reviews (CERA, 2011; Parrott et al., 2010), but what is
emerging is an ad hoc treatment of the various products that intention-
ally create novel dsRNAmolecules, with most (perhaps all so far) regu-
lators not considering the potential for adverse effects, particularly any
unintended adverse effects of the dsRNA.
We examine the history of risk assessment of GMOs producing
dsRNA, with a focus on the regulatory contexts of Australia, New
Zealand and Brazil. Australia and New Zealand have different regula-
tors for food and the environment whereas Brazil has one regulator
that performs both functions. We show similarities in the approach
by these three countries to considering the risks of dsRNA. As new
information becomes available, these regulatory procedures will no
doubt evolve. The reason for this analysis is to both create a historical
record of the emergence of this risk and for this risk to serve as another
case study in how ‘earlywarnings’may be incorporated into risk assess-
ments at the cutting edge of technology.
1.1. Risk assessment
Risk assessments are required on GM plants prior to use as food or
release into the environment in many countries (Paoletti et al., 2008).
The Codex Alimentarius Commission, a joint UN Food and Agriculture
and World Health Organization, provides international guidance on
conducting such risk assessments for human foods (Codex, 2003a,
2003b, 2008). This body is recognized by many countries as the ap-
propriate body for issuing guidance on food (e.g., Brent et al., 2003).
Codex promotes trade harmonization by limiting the range of poten-
tial objections to transboundary movement of GM-based products
(Millstone and van Zwanenberg, 2002; Paoletti et al., 2008). The closest
equivalent of the Codex on the environmental risk assessment of GMOs
is the Secretariat to the Convention on Biodiversitywhich provide guid-
ance in accordancewithAnnex III of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety
(AHTEG, 2010).
A comparative assessment can be a guiding framework for risk
assessment for food and the environment. This may be changing
with the introduction of GMOs designed to have altered nutritional
characteristics or which contain pharmaceutical or industrial products
(Heinemann, 2007; Quist et al., 2013). As such, assumptions made
either explicitly or implicitly in the context of substantial equivalence
are due for review (TBT, 2012).
1.2. RNA and generally recognized as safe (GRAS)
Unless the dsRNAmade by the GM plant is intended to act as a pes-
ticide, the RNA itself is rarely formally considered in a risk assessment.
This is surprising because Codex guidance draws special attention to
the characterization of novel RNAs, stating: “Information should be pro-
vided on any expressed substances in the recombinant-DNA plant; this
should include: A) the geneproduct(s) (e.g. a protein or anuntranslated
RNA)” (paragraph 32 of Codex, 2003a).
When unexpected RNAs derived from mRNA were detected by
independent researchers in one of the ﬁrst signiﬁcant commercial
GM soybean varieties (Rang et al., 2005; Windels et al., 2001), the
concern raised was that it may be used to create different forms of
protein rather than theRNAbeing a risk per se. In response, the developer
of the GM soy said that RNA “is generally recognized as safe (GRAS)”,
and thus “the presence of…secondary RNA transcripts themselves raises
no safety concern” (p. 5 Monsanto, 2002).
Importantly, those views have evolved and the developer has
acknowledged the value of assessing the risks of at least some novel
RNA molecules. However, a limited amount of research on those risks
has been undertaken. Thus “the current peer-reviewed literature lackspublished studies speciﬁcally assessing the safety of consuming endog-
enous longer dsRNAs, siRNAs or miRNAs in human food or animal feed”
(p. 354 Ivashuta et al., 2009).
Also the approach taken by Ivashuta et al. (2009, p. 354) which was
to produce a “documented history of safe consumption for small RNAs
in order to demonstrate the safety of the RNA molecules involved in
this form of gene suppression in plants” (p. 354 Ivashuta et al., 2009)
does not establish the safety of novel small RNAs and sequence-
determined risks. “Neither overall amounts of small RNA molecules,
nor the presence of benign small RNAs in conventional plants are sufﬁ-
cient as evidence that all novel small RNAs will be safe in the food chain
or environment” (p. 1291Heinemannet al., 2011). Earlier literature also
failed to recognize the need for sequence-determined effects (Parrott
et al., 2010). These sequence-determined activities cannot be consid-
ered GRAS in general terms without speciﬁc supporting evidence.
RNA is a common part of food and an inherent part of all organ-
isms. Thus, as a chemical, it is generally regarded as safe within the
limits of its normal concentrations, that is, perhaps not as a meal all
on its own. This is consistent with how it is considered by the Environ-
mental Protection Agency (EPA) of New Zealand (previously called the
Environmental Risk Management Authority) (for more details on this,
see Heinemann, 2009).
Like DNA, what makes RNA an issue for risk assessment is that it
has a nucleotide sequence and that sequence delimits its particular
biochemical activities. These sequence-determined activities cannot
be considered GRAS. Of particular interest is when any particular
sequence leads to a deﬁned range of matches with RNA molecules
in humans or other animals. That range can be described as:
• Perfect sequence matches of approximately 21 nucleotides long;
• Approaching or exceeding 95% identity over 40 nucleotides (Rual
et al., 2007);
• Short (≥7 contiguous) identical matches in the 3´ untranslated
region (UTR) of mRNA, which can be more determinative than
the number of matches overall (Birmingham et al., 2006).
1.3. Assessing exposure
In order for dsRNAs produced in plants to cause adverse effects in
humans and animals, there must be a route through which humans
and animals are exposed. The most likely exposure routes are ingestion
and inhalation (e.g., from wheat ﬂour used commercially and in home
kitchens), but future formulations of agents incorporating dsRNA and
designed to be absorbed may in time increase the relevance of contact
exposure.
1.3.1. Human
Some microRNAs of plant origin have been detected in the blood
of Chinese people, demonstrating that dsRNAs can survive digestion
and be taken up via the gastrointestinal tract (Zhang et al., 2012a).
These plant-derived dsRNA molecules silenced an endogenous gene
in human tissue culture cells, and in mouse liver, small intestine, and
lung (Zhang et al., 2012a).
A survey of existing transcriptomic data of small RNAmolecules from
human blood and tissue sources, farm animals and insects conﬁrmed
that regulatory RNAs from plants can be found in animals, including
humans (Zhang et al., 2012b). Interestingly, the transcriptomic survey
data found some dsRNAs from plants more frequently than predicted
from their level of expression in plants.
Evidence is lacking concerning the causes of preferential transmis-
sion or retention of plant dsRNAs in animals, and there is some doubt
whether accumulation in animal blood and tissues of plant dsRNAs
from dietary exposure is a universal mechanism or, at least in some
cases, an artifact of the sequencing process. However, no robust evidence
suggests that the exposure of humans and animals can be disregarded.
Furthermore, the authors of the transcriptome surveys did not collect
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underlying source studies drawn upon were equivalent to the human
and mouse study described above. The survey study is therefore not
able to challenge the ﬁndings of the human and mouse study.
However, the survey study did provide evidence that not all dsRNAs
may be equally prone to dietary transmission or retention (Zhang et al.,
2012b). The selective packaging of dsRNAmolecules into microvesicles
would protect and transport the dsRNAs to target tissues (Jiang et al.,
2012). Neither study, however, provided a way to predict which
dsRNA molecules would be preferentially transmitted, retained or
remain active, and under what circumstances that may occur.
1.3.2. The environment
Speciﬁc siRNAs can be toxic and the toxicity can be transmitted
through food to animals of environmental relevance. This was demon-
strated when GM maize and cotton plants were engineered to express
novel siRNAs that were intended to be toxic to target insects (Baum
et al., 2007; Gordon and Waterhouse, 2007; Mao et al., 2007). The tox-
icity was due to the dsRNA being transmitted from plant tissues to the
insects by ingestion, and then being further processed in the animal
into an siRNA that silenced one ormore genes essential for life, or essen-
tial for detoxifying natural plant toxins (i.e., gossypol in cotton). Others
have used direct feeding of dsRNAor dsRNA in liposomes as insecticides
(Chen et al., 2010; Whyard et al., 2009).
As with the human studies discussed above, there is evidence
of selective uptake of miRNAs from food. A feeding study of insects
found that some small RNAs that were less abundant in the plant
were more abundant in the insects that fed on the plant (Zhang
et al., 2012b). It also found that insects which fed on dicots seemed
to accumulate a miRNA that was more suggestive of a monocot origin.
As a meta-analysis of small RNA datasets, this study could not conﬁrm
the purity of diets or exposure routes for animals (e.g., ingestion,
inhalation, soaking through skin). The authors suggested that many
or most detections of plant miRNAs in animals occurred via contami-
nation from non-dietary sources. While this is important speculation,
contamination does not sufﬁciently explain all the results. The contam-
ination source proposed by the authors was from the mixture of plant
and animal small RNA pools combined during multiplex sequencing.
This can occur because of the capacity of the DNA sequencers to run
reactions in parallel. However, that conclusion seems at oddswith regu-
lar detection by others of miRNAs of plant origin that are not the most
abundant plant miRNAs and assumes that all datasets assembled by
others would have had the same mixture of plant and animal libraries
used by the authors of the transcriptomic survey (Zhang et al., 2012b).
2. Examples of how GM crops containing dsRNA are regulated
2.1. Example 1: Food Standards Australia New Zealand (FSANZ)
The regulatory framework for GM crops in Australia and New
Zealand consists of a shared food safety regulator called FSANZ. Under
the Food Safety Act, FSANZ must approve as safe all foods derived
from GMOs, following an assessment based on “internationally recog-
nized scientiﬁc, risk-based methods” (p. 411 Brent et al., 2003). FSANZ
uses information provided by the developer of the GMO, but also the sci-
entiﬁc literature, advice from independent scientists and the evaluations
of regulators from other countries (Brent et al., 2003; Hansard, 2008).
The Centre for Integrated Research in Biosafety (INBI) has argued
within the regulatory framework of Australia/New Zealand that as
part of the legislated requirement for safety testing of GMOs, any poten-
tial novel dsRNA molecules should be described and then evaluated
for causing physiological effects in the GM plant or on any consumer
of the plant, be that insects, wildlife or humans (Heinemann, 2009;
Heinemann et al., 2011). Based on the same data as used by the safety
regulator, INBI recommended that the kind, quantity and effects of
any unintended dsRNAs produced in the GMO should be described(where possible), and then be included in a ﬁnal evaluation of whether
the food is “as safe as” (p. 410 Brent et al., 2003) the non-GM counter-
part. INBI scientists predicted that dsRNA could be transmitted to
humans through food, and that dsRNA would be sufﬁciently resistant
to cooking and normal stomach pHs to potentially be taken up by cells
or circulated through blood. If this were the case, there would be the
potential to cause unintended and possibly adverse gene silencing in
humans (Heinemann et al., 2011).
FSANZ, however, has regularly dismissed INBI’s recommendation
to describe and evaluate dsRNA unique to, or produced at unique
amounts in, GM food. FSANZ has argued that 1) dsRNA does not trans-
mit to humans through food; 2) dsRNA would be unstable in cooking
or during digestion; and 3) the techniques that might be used to ﬁnd
dsRNAs are not routinely used in safety studies.
For example, in INBI's (then called NZIGE) ﬁrst submission to FSANZ
on an application called A524 (application for Roundup Ready wheat) in
2004, INBI called attention to the potential for dsRNA to transmit from
GMplants to humans through food. INBIwas referring to the unintended
production of novel dsRNA molecules in its submission because the GM
wheat being considered by FSANZ was not engineered to purposefully
produce these molecules. Nevertheless, silencing effects are commonly
caused through the genetic engineering process and the concerns were
relevant. FSANZ never replied to INBI because the applicant withdrew
the application prior to FSANZ issuing a decision on the product.
In January of 2005 and also in June of 2006, INBI again corresponded
with FSANZ on the potential for dsRNA to cause adverse effects, and the
plausibility of food as an exposure route, in its series of submissions on
application A549 (approval for GM high lysine corn LY038). Through
this exchange FSANZ made clear its reasoning on dsRNA.INBI
(NZIGE):“The creation of novel RNA molecules by insertion of DNA into the
maize genome could create species of RNA that are harmful to
humans, possibly through food.”
“An adequate molecular characterization of all novel RNA molecules,
that may pose a risk to consumers, is missing along with microarray
analysis of the transcriptome of the LY038 line. There is published
evidence that genetic components of the LY038 event produce novel
RNAmolecules. There is also evidence in animal studies that some small
RNA molecules can be transmitted through food, causing lasting,
sometimes heritable, effects on consumers and their children.”
“In order tomake an assessment of global changes in the transcriptome,
and speciﬁc changes cause by the insertion(s) of I-DNA, the Authority
should require microarray descriptions capable of detecting novel RNA
species in the modiﬁed plant, with the RNA source being the plant
grown under a variety of relevant ﬁeld conditions. The microarray
should comprehensively represent the genomes of the cultivar of maize
modiﬁed and unmodiﬁed, and any novel RNA species should be tested
against the human genome for RNAi activity [emphasis added].”
“Microarray descriptions should be capable of detecting novel RNA
species in the modiﬁed plant, with the RNA source being the plant
grown under a variety of relevant ﬁeld conditions. The microarray
should comprehensively represent the genomes of the cultivar of maize
modiﬁed and unmodiﬁed. Since LY038 may be found in food, variant
RNAs should be screen using a microarray for the human genome.”FSANZ: “The rationale behind this recommendation is presented in the NZIGE
submission in Section 1.3. This section presents a summary of the
biological properties of RNA that is generally accurate. However, the
scientiﬁc evidence does not support the theory that RNAmolecules in food
can be transmitted to mammalian cells and exert effects on endogenous
genes. RNA is rapidly degraded even in intact cells. Following harvest,
processing, cooking and digestion, it is unlikely that intact RNA would
remain. Even if it did, it is very unlikely that it would enter human cells and
be able to exert effects on endogenous genes [emphasis added].
What little is known about transcription levels of genes across entire
plant genomes indicates that gene transcription may vary considerably
even between closely related plants (Bruce et al., 2001; Guo et al., 2003;
Umezawa et al., 2004). This high level of differential expression is
thought to be due to a number of factors including environmental
conditions and genotype. For this reason, analysis of changes in the
transcriptome, while interesting, would not indicate whether these
changes are within the range of natural variation nor would it provide
any further information on the safety of the food” (FSANZ, 2006).
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to argue that existing evidence was sufﬁcient to dismiss relevant expo-
sure routes. For example, FSANZ did not draw on scientiﬁc evidence
when it said that dsRNA would be degraded in the stomach, all dsRNA
would be equally prone to degradation, none would be subject to
recruitment, all would be passed through ingestion (and not also inha-
lation), and that plant-derived dsRNAs were incapable of being taken
up by human cells. In doing so, it avoided having to consider the possi-
bility of adverse effects of dsRNA because it did not recognize a route of
exposure. Critically, FSANZ ignored sequence-determined risks when it
referred to natural variation in transcription.
INBI continued to alert FSANZ both to the use of assumption-based
reasoning and to the scientiﬁc plausibility of the exposure routes in
its subsequent submission on application A1018 (2009), where a
GM soybean was intended to produce a novel dsRNA. In that case,
rather than respond to the expressed safety concerns, FSANZ focused
exclusively on available proﬁling techniques for detecting the mole-
cules (FSANZ, 2009a). The response failed to address the substantive
issue of the exposure route.
From Table 1 it is clear that FSANZ has approved for use as human
food at least 5 GM products (described in applications A383, A384,
A387, A1018, A1049) with modiﬁcations intended to produce novel
forms or concentrations of dsRNA. The ﬁrst approval we could ﬁnd
occurred in 2000. These approvals were made despite FSANZ’s ac-
knowledgement that there was scientiﬁc uncertainty about how the
modiﬁcation caused the trait. For instance, in its approval of virus-
resistant potato (application A384) FSANZ said: “The exact mechanism
by which the viral protection occurs is unknown” (p. 8). Little had
changed by the time FSANZ approved GM soybeans in application
A1018: “The Applicant speculates that suppression of expression of
the endogenous gm-fad2-1 gene is mediated via co-suppression in
which the introduced fragment leads to an overabundant production
of sense mRNA which in turn leads to production of dsRNA via a path-
way that is still not understood” (emphasis added to p. 12). To which
INBI responded that: “Under such circumstances where the bio-
chemistry of the modiﬁcation itself is considered to be speculation
and is not understood, it is difﬁcult to understand how FSANZ has
achieved conﬁdence that the Applicant could report all unintended
effects of the modiﬁcation.”
INBI was able to make scientiﬁcally credible submissions on the
biology, biochemistry and chemistry of RNA. This was acknowledged
by FSANZ, who stated: “the NZIGE submission…presents a summary
of the biological properties of RNA that is generally accurate”. INBI
created an exposure scenario and potential adverse effects based on
its knowledge of nucleic acid chemistry, the biochemistry of silencing
pathways and extensive expertise in the biochemistry of horizontal
gene transfer. Subsequently, the predictions about exposure routes
and potential for food-transmitted dsRNA to alter gene expression
in humans and animals were systematically conﬁrmed (Hirschi,
2012; Zhang et al., 2012a). Here are various statements made by
FSANZ on the topic of acknowledging the risk of transmission of
dsRNA from GM plants being considered for approval for use as
food and contrasting evidence-based statements from the scientiﬁc
literature:FSANZ
(2006)“However, the scientiﬁc evidence does not support the theory that
RNA molecules in food can be transmitted to mammalian cells and
exert effects on endogenous genes”.Zhang et al.
(2012a)“Further in vitro and in vivo analysis demonstrated for the ﬁrst time
that food-derived exogenous plant MIR168a can pass through the
mouse gastrointestinal (GI) track and enter the circulation and var-
ious organs especially the liver where it cross-kingdomly regulates
mouse LDLRAP1 protein expression and physiological condition.”
“Functional studies in vitro and in vivo demonstrated that MIR168a
could bind to the human/mouse low-density lipoprotein receptor
adapter protein 1 (LDLRAP1) mRNA, inhibit LDLRAP1 expression in
liver, and consequently decrease LDL removal from mouse plasma.These ﬁndings demonstrate that exogenous plant miRNAs in food
can regulate the expression of target genes in mammals.”
“plant MIR168a and MIR156a were detected in various mouse
tissues, including liver, small intestine, and lung”Zhang et al.
(2012b)“Of 83 animal [small]RNA public datasets used for analysis, 63
(including 5 datasets fromhumanandmouse cultured cell lines) had at
least one sequence that had perfect identity to a known plant miRNA”FSANZ
(2006)“RNA is rapidly degraded even in intact cells. Following harvest,
processing, cooking and digestion, it is unlikely that intact RNA
would remain”.Zhang et al.
(2012a)“Interestingly, plant miRNA were stable in cooked foods”.
“To mimic GI tract environment, the effect of acidiﬁcation on the
stability of plantmiRNAs andmammalianmiRNAswas examined. Total
RNA isolated from rice or mouse liver was adjusted to pH 2.0 and kept
at 37°C for several hours…acidiﬁcation did not signiﬁcantly affect the
yield and quality of miRNAs. The majority of plant miRNAs and
mammalianmiRNAs can survive under acidic condition for at least 6 h.”This comparison of assumptions used by FSANZ and quotes from
the recent literature exposes the weakness of assumption-based rea-
soning in risk assessment.2.2. Example 2: Ofﬁce of the Gene Technology Regulator (OGTR) Australia
The OGTR is Australia's regulator for ﬁeld trials and commercial
releases of GM plants into the environment (Fox et al., 2006). The
OGTR has issued 10 licences for ﬁeld trials of GM wheat since 2007
(OGTR, 2012a). Traits being tested range from abiotic stress tolerance
to altered grain starch and nutritional characteristics. Of these, we
focus primarily on licenses DIR093 and DIR112 issued to the Com-
monwealth Scientiﬁc and Industrial Research Organisations (CSIRO)
to ﬁeld-test wheat with altered grain starch composition and to use
some of the wheat to feed human volunteers to determine if the
wheat had certain commercially-desired effects in the volunteers.
The DIR093 decision concerns the genetically modiﬁed wheat
varieties that use dsRNA to silence the gene SEI in the endosperm of
the plant. SEI encodes a starch branching enzyme. Barley varieties
were also developed that were intended to silence two genes called
SEI and SEII that encode for branching enzymes in the endosperm.
The RNAi was created through the introduction of recombinant DNA
molecules, or transgenes, that were constructed to produce sub-
strates for the endogenous dsRNA processing pathways in plants.
These constructs involve tandem repeats of two sequences, with
the second sequence being in the opposite orientation (i.e., an inverted
repeat) to the ﬁrst. This allows for intra-molecular base-pairing and en-
courages the formation of short-hairpin dsRNA (Fig. 2). The repeated
sequences are presumably exonic sequences from SEI and SEII, respec-
tively, separated by intron 3 of SEI. The constructs were intended to
be processed through canonical splicing pathways to remove intron
3 and increase the efﬁciency of processing the resulting dsRNA into
siRNA.
According to the OGTR: “The partial sequences used in the con-
structs were isolated from wheat, and non-GM barley contains homo-
logues of the introduced wheat genes; the regulatory sequences are
also widespread in the environment” (p. 38 OGTR, 2009). While this
is impossible to independently verify because the sequence of the
transgene was protected as conﬁdential commercial information
(OGTR, 2009), it is unlikely to be correct at the RNA level for three
reasons. First, the sequence at the RNA level is unique to the GM
plant because there is no RNA in the non-GM plant that has both
the matching and inverted repeat on the same strand. Second, and
importantly, presumably no dsRNA molecule of this type exists in
non-GM wheat. Third, there is recognition by the OGTR that the
transformation process may lead to incorporation of ‘vector’ se-
quences (OGTR, 2009). These are DNA molecules that have never
been part of the wheat genome. So while many parts of this sequence
may exist in places in the wheat genome, it is inaccurate to conclude
Fig. 2. Hypothetical structures of regulatory RNA molecules in GM wheat of DIR093.
Arrows indicate repeated sequences and their orientation. The numbers 5′ and 3′ indicate
strand polarity. The grey line labeled intron 3 is the third intron of the wheat gene SEI.
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structure or function in our food.
There is no evidence in DIR093 that the risk assessment process
considered the risk that the dsRNAmay transmit to animals or people
(see Table 6 of OGTR, 2009). At the time that the decision was written,
the potential for the dsRNA to transmit to insects and nematodes was
well known (Baum et al., 2007; Cogoni and Macino, 2000; Gordon and
Waterhouse, 2007; Mao et al., 2007; Tabara et al., 1998). In fact, the
CSIRO holds a fundamental patent on the technique for expressing
dsRNA in GMOs for the purpose of transmitting the dsRNA to target
pests, with the aim of affecting the biology of those pests (Whyard
et al., 2011). Indeed, in its patent application, the CSIRO makes claim
to a process for delivering dsRNA through “feeding a transgenic organ-
ism expressing the dsRNA to the arthropod. The transgenic organism is
selected from, but not limited to, the group consisting of: plants, yeast,
fungi, algae, bacteria or another arthropod expressing the dsRNA.”
Because it did not consider the risks of the dsRNA transmitting to
animals and people who ate the GM wheat, ipso facto, the OGTR did
not consider which genes may be silenced by any such transmission.
It therefore may not have considered that animals and humans have
similar sequences within their mRNAs to those present in the GM
plants. Nor did it consider the possible consequences of partial or com-
plete silencing of unintended target genes in animals and people.
In fact, the OGTR stated that there was no identiﬁed risk from the
dsRNA in these GM wheat varieties. The OGTR deﬁnes risk as: “A risk
is only identiﬁed when a hazard is considered to have some chance of
causing harm. Events that do not lead to an adverse outcome, or could
not reasonably occur, do not represent an identiﬁed risk and do not
advance any further in the risk assessment process” (p. 2 OGTR, 2009).
Thus it can be concluded on the basis of this information that a risk
assessmentwas not done on the dsRNA and experiments testing speciﬁc
risk hypotheseswere not required by the regulator. Indeed the regulator
was quite speciﬁc about not requiring any risk assessment for animals
or humans eating the GM wheat, stating on page 32 of DIR093: “The
potential for allergic reactions in people, or toxicity in people and
other organisms as a result of exposure to GM plants with altered
grain starch composition as a result of the introduced RNAi constructs
is not an identiﬁed risk andwill not be assessed further”, and issuing sim-
ilar conclusions on environmental risks on page 33. In drawing these
conclusions, the OGTR only considered the effect of altered grain com-
position, and not the sequence-determined potential effects of the
dsRNA. Perhaps for this reason, the OGTR permitted the CSIRO to under-
take animal and human feeding studies to investigate whether the GM
wheat had the anticipated commercially attractive beneﬁts without
ﬁrst requiring the CSIRO to look for any adverse health effects.
Furthermore, in a license issued under DIR112 for a different trait
in wheat created through the use of RNAi, the OGTR again said that
there was no identiﬁed risk arising from the dsRNA made by the
wheat. However, by the time this license was approved, experimental
evidence of the exposure route to humans was available. The OGTR
document was cognisant of this, stating: “As discussed in Risk Scenario
5, RNAi constructs (via siRNAs) can give rise to off-target silencing
effects within the plant, leading to changes other than the intendedeffects. In addition, a recent publication [(Zhang et al., 2012a)] has
reported evidence that natural plant miRNAs can be absorbed bymam-
mals through food intake, and have the potential to modulate gene
expression in animals” (paragraph 120 OGTR, 2012b).
The OGTR justiﬁed its position using assumption-based reasoning:
“Even if novel small RNAs are taken up by people or animals, to have
any effect a number of conditions would have to be met: the siRNA-
containing wheat would need to constitute a large proportion of the
diet, the siRNA would need to be expressed at high levels in the
wheat material consumed, match a target sequence of a human or
animal gene and be taken up by speciﬁc human and animal cells
expressing that gene. Lastly, it is likely that even if the siRNAs were
acquired through food intake and did affect the expression of mam-
malian genes, such an effect would be transient as was reported by”
(Zhang et al., 2012a) (paragraph 123 OGTR, 2012b).
These assumptions remain to be tested. So far, there is no evidence
to quantify what proportion of the diet is required to reveal important
effects. Consequently, there is no understanding of how much expo-
sure could be considered to be safe. Furthermore, recurring dietary
exposure to the GM wheat could result in “transient” effects that were
more or less constantly present and hence would be relevant to a risk
assessment.
In theory, very few molecules of siRNA are needed to cause a thera-
peutically relevant effect, and possibly fewer still to cause some effect
even if complete silencing is not the outcome of exposure to an siRNA.
First, there is evidence of a sequence-independent toxic effect of dsRNA.
This kind of toxic effect is length dependent, e.g., molecules over
30 base-pairs in length (Bass, 2001; Elbashir et al., 2001). Second,
sequence-determined risks can be primed in some organisms by an
initially small number of dsRNA molecules. “It has been suggested
that one siRNA can cleave asmany as ten cognatemRNAs. This catalytic
nature of mRNA targeting by siRNAs…suggest[s] that a potent siRNA
will effectively function at much lower concentrations without saturat-
ing the endogenous miRNA machinery. It has been estimated that, it
may take only about 1,000 siRNA molecules/cell to silence gene
expression efﬁciently (an estimate derived from the frequencies of
individual endogenous miRNAs in cells). Quantitative information
about the numbers of siRNAs required for efﬁcient gene silencing
would be important for establishing safe dosing regimen for RNAi
drugs and to avoid potential toxicity” (p. 598 Seyhan, 2011). Further-
more, bees fed daily on dsRNA directed at a bee virus demonstrated
resistance to the virus (Maori et al., 2009), suggesting that regular
exposure through food can have potent physiological and immuno-
logical consequences.
Moreover, RNAi can cause heritable changes (through epigenetic
transmission) that may result in persistent changes either within
cells or entire tissues of people, and be heritable through reproduction
in some animals and other organisms (Cogoni and Macino, 2000;
Cortessis et al., 2012; Lejeune and Allshire, 2011).
Neither sequence-independent nor sequence-determined off-target
risks formed part of the risk assessment described in the OGTR docu-
ments, despite the OGTR’s Scenario 5 recognising their existence. This
omission occurred even though unintended secondary dsRNAs may be
generated in the GMO (Dillin, 2003; Pak and Fire, 2007; Sijen et al.,
2007) or in animals exposed to the GMO (Baum et al., 2007; Gordon
and Waterhouse, 2007) and neither the identity of the secondary
dsRNAs nor their consequences can be predicted. These secondary
dsRNAs may have gene regulatory activities and thus act like siRNA.
This means that dsRNAs created by the genetic engineering of plants
may cause the production of additional unintended or unanticipated
dsRNA molecules in both the genetically engineered plant and in any
organism that is exposed to it through inhalation or consumption.
With the anticipated development of biopesticides and other agents
containing dsRNAs intended to transverse epidermal layers of plants
or target insects (Monsanto; Zhang et al., 2013), contact exposure
may also have to be considered.
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Comissão Técnica Nacional de Biossegurança (CTNBio) Brazil
CTNBio is a consulting and deliberating multidisciplinary collegiate
body that establishes safety technical norms for the authorization of
research-related activities and the commercial use of GMOs and their
by-products, based on Biosafety Law 11.105/2005 and their normatives
(e.g. Normative Resolution no 5 regarding risk assessments rules). In its
deliberations, CTNBio uses information given to it from the developer of
the technology as well as submissions sent by independent scientists
and the community (Ordinance no. 373, article 2nd).
Independent scientists raised safety questions to this body during
the decision making process for approval in Brazil of a GM variety of
pinto bean (Phaseolus vulgaris) event 5.1. The bean was made virus
resistant through induced RNAi (Aragão and Faria, 2009).
In this example, we will focus our discussion on the scientiﬁc ar-
guments presented by researchers at the Federal University of Santa
Catarina (UFSC) (Agapito-Tenfen and Nodari, 2011) that were sub-
mitted to CTNBio and CTNBio's technical report (CTNBio, 2011).
The transgenic pinto bean was genetically modiﬁed using particle
bombardment, which introduced an insert of about 50 kbp into the
bean genome (Aragão and Faria, 2010b). From this insert an intron-
hairpin construction (i.e., a rep cassette) was transcribed to induce
post-transcriptional gene silencing against the AC1 gene of the Bean
Gold Mosaic virus (Bonﬁm et al., 2007). Similar to the wheat example
above, the hairpin RNA mimics a miRNA. In this case, the dsRNA is
capable of silencing the viral mRNA for the replication protein. How-
ever, the mechanism by which the viral protection occurs in this spe-
ciﬁc event is unknown (see page 12 of Aragão and Faria, 2010b).
Similar to the case of FSANZ, CTNBio has accepted uncertainties
about the underlying biochemistry of the trait in their decision to
grant approval.
The Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation (Embrapa) claimed
conﬁdentiality about the details of the DNA sequence and associated
molecular characterizations of the product (see page 12 of Aragão
and Faria, 2010b). This was agreed by CTNBio (see pages 1 and 6 of
CTNBio, 2011). As with the case described in Example 2 above, an in-
dependent evaluation of the actual sequences used in the GM pinto
beans was impossible. In addition, there appear to be more details
granted conﬁdentiality than just the DNA sequence, further compli-
cating attempts to provide the regulator with external opinions
(Supplementary Data).
The Embrapa 5.1 event that was assessed has truncated copies of
the rep cassette, including one copy in the anti-sense orientation,
and plant genome sequences incorporated adjacent to the rep cas-
sette (Aragão, 2011; Aragão and Faria, 2010a). The researchers at
UFSC argued that truncated forms of the rep cassette, as well as unex-
pected adjacent sequences, could generate dsRNA molecules that
could lead to adverse off-target effects in the bean or other organisms
eating the bean.
The detection of dsRNAs in raw and cooked plant organs (seed
and leaves) was only tested using northern blotting which is based
on probe afﬁnity hybridization. This technique is not quantitative
or as discriminating as, for example, quantitative real time PCR
(q-RT-PCR) or high-throughput sequencing of the small RNA pool
(Heinemann et al., 2011). Northern blotting should have been used
in conjunction with q-RT-PCR which can detect targets at even
lower concentrations with high stringency because it uses small
primers (e.g., around 15bp). The techniques complement one another
because rearrangements that might produce false negative PCR re-
sults may be detected by northern blotting, and PCR is more sensitive.
Moreover, the CTNBio risk assessment did not report on the possibil-
ity of unintended RNAs being transcribed from additional inserts in
the form of truncated copies, which were detected, nor did it require
conﬁrmation of the sequence and structure of the intended and antic-
ipated dsRNA molecules.To address these concerns, the UFSC researchers suggested that
the intended dsRNA molecules should be conﬁrmed and quanti-
ﬁed, and safety testing for adverse effects should include feeding
studies.
The safety assessment did include a rat feeding study, but for various
reasons thiswas not considered to be satisfactory for testing the speciﬁc
hypothesis of an adverse effect arising from the dsRNA. In that study,
Wistar rats were fed for 35 days. One group of 10 rats was fed raw
transgenic pinto beans; a second group of ten rats was fed on conven-
tional raw pinto beans; a third (control) group of ten rats was fed a
casein-rich diet; and a fourth (control) group of four rats was fed a
non-protein diet. However, only 3 rats per group were killed for the
morphological, histological and biochemical analyses. The proponent
did not perform any immunological analyses of pregnant rats or any
second-generation rats as requested by CTNBio Normative Resolution
no 5 Annex III. They argued that “there was no scientiﬁc basis” to do
so “since no alteration in animal weight gain was observed” (p. 106
Aragão and Faria, 2010b).
Moreover, raw beans caused the death of many rats starting
20 days after the start of the experiment but the exact number of
dead animals was not disclosed (Aragão and Faria, 2010b). It is well
known that anti-nutritional factors common in beans, as for soybeans,
are removed by cooking (Gupta, 1987), and these effects could have
obscured any more subtle toxic or other potential effects of the dsRNA.
In another study, rats were fed orally with a solution of 6 mg of
total RNA extracted from leaves. Not only were few details of this
experiment provided, such as the number of rats used or length of
the study, but the use of total RNA from leaves as feed would not
appropriately address possible health effects deriving from the new
dsRNA molecules, especially in humans, as humans do not eat pinto
bean leaves. This approach fails to address important variables. First,
in extracting the entire transcriptome, there is no assurance that the
different physical forms of the RNA (large vs. small, single-stranded
vs. double-stranded transcripts) will be retained in the sample with
equal efﬁciency. Second, the extraction procedure might remove other
factors speciﬁcally associated withmiRNA-likemolecules, such as argo-
naut proteins or microvesicles, that might be relevant to their protec-
tion during digestion and or transport following ingestion. Third, the
concentration and kind of dsRNAs in leaves might be different to
beans. Finally, the feeding studies used were not equivalent to a safety
assessment for humans because the use of leaves and uncooked beans
did not take into account the “potential effects of food processing,
including home preparation” (p. 18 Codex, 2003a) because humans
do not eat the leaves or uncooked beans.
In this example we introduce an additional biosafety consider-
ation beyond human food safety and effects on beneﬁcial environ-
mental organisms.
In order for the GM bean to be effective, any viruses exposed to the
transgenic plantmust be reliably contained and neutralized by the RNAi
effect in order for the trait to be effective. If the effect of the RNAi
response is inconsistent or weak, enough viruses may replicate to
generate random variants that overcome or counter dsRNA-mediated
silencing (Lafforgue et al., 2011). For example, a variantwith amutation
in the AC1 gene that reduced the number of matches with the guide
RNA might then arise by selection on the GM bean.
That is, in this case the dsRNA is similar to the insect toxin
expressed by “Bt” plants in that it has an intended target effect on a
pest/pathogen population. As a pest resistance trait, the bean creates
a selective pressure on the virus population. If that pressure is too
weak, it might undermine pathogen management. Insecticidal plants
are approved for use in the context of a pest management strategy to
maintain the efﬁcacy of the trait. The management strategy for Bt
plants, e.g., the use of a high-dose coupled with a nonGM refuge, is
meant to both maintain the efﬁcacy of the product and to prevent
the GM plant from undermining the use of Bacillus thuringiensis as a
pesticide in non-GM farms (Heinemann, 2007).
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mercial process of developing a GM plant, the stability of the expres-
sion of the intended trait should be part of the risk assessment
process. This is especially true given that Embrapa's event 5.1 demon-
strated variability in susceptibility levels. Embrapa reported that from
10 to 36% of F1 individuals, depending on the genetic background
of the plant, were virus susceptible (Aragão and Faria, 2010b). The
developer had hypothesized that the presence of susceptible pheno-
types in these hemizygous plants can be explained by the concept
of ‘gene-dosage’ (Aragão and Faria, 2010b). That is, the hemizygous
plants may express a smaller amount of the intended dsRNA mole-
cules than homozygous plants.
However, UFSC researchers have argued that ‘gene-dosage’ alone
does not explain the difference in susceptibility levels. For instance,
in Table V.17 of Aragão and Faria (2010b) data indicate a variety of
susceptibilities for hemizygotes only. These plants would all have
the same number of transgenes. The UFSC researchers then proposed
three hypotheses that could explain the results obtained for the F1
plants: (i) instability or truncation of the insert; (ii) environment x
gene interactions; or (iii) virus-mediated transgene silencing or resis-
tance to silencing (Noris et al., 2004; Taliansky et al., 2004). Testing
these hypotheses would have provided the regulator with the bio-
chemical explanation of the varying levels of resistance and informed
a risk management plan. However, CTNBio did not require the devel-
oper to address the varying susceptibility levels. Interestingly, the
regulator appeared unaware of this variability because they conclud-
ed that the segregation pattern was what they expected and that
the observed phenotypes were normal in all crosses made (CTNBio,
2011).
3. Generalising from the examples
Although a few products based on dsRNA-mediated silencing
have been approved, the commercialization history of these prod-
ucts is spotty. Flavr Savr Tomato, New Leaf Potatoes and the G series
of high oleic acid soybeans were withdrawn from market shortly
after release (FSANZ, 2009b; Monsanto, 2001). The exceptions are
papaya and pinto beans which have been consumed on a relatively
small basis.
Given that few people would be exposed to artiﬁcial siRNAs, and
exposed in low amounts through consuming currently approved
products, it is not surprising that regulators from different countries
have not established common, validated assessment procedures for
these molecules (ACNFP, 2012; Lusser et al., 2011). A validation pro-
cess establishes both the relevance and reliability of a test. Validation
usually involves establishing the test deﬁnition, assessing the within-
and between-laboratory variation in the results, the transferability of
the test between laboratories, the predictive capacity of the test, how
applicable the test is to the situation and how well the test conforms
to certain standards (Hartung et al., 2004). Regulation of traits based
on dsRNA in GMOs is therefore currently based on ad hoc standards
and acceptance of unpublished studies conducted by GMO developers
even though the approval of the ﬁrst human food based on dsRNA-
mediated silencing occurred nearly 20 years ago. The regulatory com-
munity is only now actively debating how these molecules should be
assessed.
There are also discordant statements about expected standards
appearing in the literature. For example, The US Environmental Pro-
tection Agency (EPA) considers dsRNAs intended as pesticides to be
biopesticides and they are considered on a case-by-case basis (letter
from US EPA to JAH, personal ﬁles). However, some have reported
that the US EPA requires that dsRNA for use as a biopesticide must
have fewer than 20 matching nucleotides in a row to any unintended
target gene to ensure the absence of off-target effects (BBSRC, 2012;
Maori et al., 2009). However, we could not verify this with the US
EPA, who said: “The EPA's Ofﬁce of Pesticide Programs has not issuedany speciﬁc regulatory guidance on dsRNA and honey bees” (letter
from US EPA to JAH, personal ﬁles).
While the absence of validation of scientiﬁc procedures has often
been used by regulators to resist incorporating new scientiﬁc
ﬁndings into the safety assessment of GM products (Heinemann et
al., 2011), the absence of validated procedures for widely used
approaches in current safety testing does not seem to have been
equally problematic.
Since there are no internationally agreed and validated procedures
for excluding either exposure routes or potential adverse effects of
particular dsRNA molecules that may be produced as a result of ge-
netic engineering, whether intended or otherwise, for the foreseeable
future all GMOs intended for release (as a ﬁeld trial or to unregulated
status) or food should be submitted to a battery of testing for un-
known dsRNAs and unintended effects of dsRNAs. The testing should
provide empirical evidence capable of delivering conﬁdence for any
claims of the absence of any unintended dsRNAs or of an unintended
effects of any dsRNAs.
We hope to ﬁll some of the void on this topic by suggesting a test-
ing regime in Section 4.3.1. Common assumption-based regulatory approaches
GMO risk assessment has a history of contention and contested
practices reﬂecting an underlying landscape of scientiﬁc uncertainty
and lack of consensus (e.g. Dolezel et al., 2006, 2011; Séralini et al.,
2009, 2012). Products based on dsRNA techniques have been placed
in the commercial marketplace before a complete understanding of
the biochemistry has been established (see Example 1), even before
the basis of the trait was understood to function via RNAi. For exam-
ple, it was not until years after approval and subsequent withdrawal
of the Flavr Savr Tomato that the owner of the crop determined that
the engineered characteristics were actually based on RNAi (Sanders
and Hiatt, 2005). In fact, approvals remain in place on most
dsRNA-based traits without, to our knowledge, any peer-reviewed
published evidence of the existence of the intended dsRNA mole-
cules and conﬁrmation of the cause of silencing. This may occur
due to market forces and innovation policies placing incentives on
the early commercialization of technology, resulting in products
that outpace the development of safety-assuring science and periods
of reﬂection by the scientiﬁc community.
That dsRNA could cause silencing in humans was considered sur-
prising just 12 years ago, because of assumptions that sequence-
determined silencing should not work in humans (Bass, 2001). Such
assumptions had legacy effects in risk assessment well after it was
shown that initial failures to demonstrate RNAi in humans were due
to using dsRNA molecules that were too long and induced a sequence
non-speciﬁc interferon response and general cessation of translation
(Bass, 2001; Elbashir et al., 2001).
dsRNAs developed for use as drugs in medicine have also ﬂoun-
dered. Despite their huge potential and an initial rush to get them
to clinical testing, they have failed to work because they cannot be de-
livered at effective concentrations (Seyhan, 2011). Failure to achieve
a man-made delivery system does not imply that all dsRNAs are
safe because not all dsRNAs are equally efﬁciently taken up or stable
(see Section 1.3.1), and the effects of some may be enough to cause
harm at concentrations lower than needed to cause the intended
trait (Zhao et al., 2001).
Assumption-based deﬂection of risk is not unique to GMOs or
dsRNA. For example, scientiﬁc conﬂict on the appropriateness of the
safety testing of the now withdrawn drug VIOXX arose early in the
drug's lifetime but was not taken seriously until harm became evident
(Box 1). The assumptions behind the VIOXX approval and assump-
tions highlighted in the examples above demonstrate how regulatory
bodies, rather than requiring evidence that a product is safe before
Box 1
Other assumption-based failures.
(1) VIOXX (also known as rofecoxib) is the trade name for an anti-inflammatory drug that was popular among those who suffer from
arthritis. The drug was approved by the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and sold from 1999. By the time it was withdrawn
from the market in 2004, it was estimated to have caused 139,000 heart attacks and killed 26,000 people (Michaels, 2005;Wadman,
2005).
The delay in identifying the risk was caused by the manufacturer not publishing its safety data until 18 months after the drug was com-
mercialized (Topol, 2004). Independent scientists re-analyzed the published data, found a worrying trend in them and recommended
that the drug be re-evaluated for its cardiovascular effects (Mukherjee et al., 2001). “Given the remarkable exposure and popularity of
this new class of medications, we believe that it is mandatory to conduct a trial specifically assessing cardiovascular risk and benefit
of these agents. Until then, we urge caution in prescribing these agents to patients at risk for cardiovascular morbidity” (p. 958
Mukherjee et al., 2001).
This recommendation was dismissed by the manufacturer, whose scientists instead argued that the drug used as a control (naproxen)
was impressively and unexpectedly cardioprotective (Michaels, 2005; Topol, 2004). The FDA failed to require independent testing
(Michaels, 2005; Topol, 2004). If the recommended study had been conducted shortly after it was recommended in 2001, the
drug might have been off the market 3 years earlier, or still on the market but sold only to a more limited range of patients.
(2) In 1995, one of the UK's leading laboratories on transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSE, also known as prion diseases),
rushed into publication a preliminary study with relevance to the question of whether the infectious agent could transmit from cattle to
humans (Anonymous, 1995).
The study used mice that were genetically modified to express a human version of a protein that changes in conformation when
humans develop Creutzfeldt–Jacob disease (CJD). These mice were then exposed to the bovine version of the protein derived from
animals with bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE). There was no statistically significant increase in TSE in these mice, suggesting
that the agent causing BSE was not transmissible to humans from cattle (Collinge et al., 1995).
The journal published a news item in the same issue wherein it reported a conflict between the authors and other scientists, the latter
claiming that the results were neither informative for the conclusion nor responsibly published even when qualified as preliminary
(Anonymous, 1995). The essence of the concern was that the disease can have an incubation period between exposure and symp-
toms; the animals may not have been old enough to show symptoms at the time of publication (Hope, 1995); and the incubation pe-
riod for cross-species disease was already known to be longer still. Critically important, and recognized by the authors at the time, was
the possibility that their results could be false negatives because of interference by the mouse version of the protein, stating: “Inter-
ference with human prion propagation by mouse PrP may also be relevant” (p. 782 Collinge et al., 1995). The relevant control group of
mice expressing only the human form of the protein had been started much later and results were not available at the time they chose
to publish.
Questions remain about why the article was published when it was based on preliminary data, and why it was published by such a
prestigious journal at a key time in the government's deliberation on the safety of UK beef, rather than waiting a fewmonths for a com-
plete set of experiments to be finished. It later would be shown that the infectious particle in beef could transmit to humans (and to GM
mice), with the Collinge group among those credited with providing convincing evidence (Almond and Pattison, 1997). In an obscure
addendum to the 1995 article appearing again in Nature, the group announced “We also included the interim results of challenge of
mice expressing only human prion protein…with BSE; these mice had remained disease-free 264 days post-inoculation. We have
now found that from 489 days onwards, some of these…mice developed a prion disease” (p. 526 Collinge et al., 1997).
According to Google Scholar (22 October 2011), there are 173 citations of the 1995 Nature article, 971 to the 1997 Nature article
credited with making the connection between food-born prions and the form of CJD (new variant CJD (vCJD)), but only 1 citation
to the 1997 Nature addendum linking the preliminary (and false negative) 1995 results to the findings of infectivity confirmed in 1997.
By 2009, at least 164 deaths were attributed to vCJD (Cummings, 2010). How many more people ate tainted UK beef for longer be-
cause of this study is not possible to determine. However, at least one highly prominent UK neuroscientist at the time reversed his
previous advice to the public to avoid UK beef (Anonymous, 1995).
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harm to withdraw the product from the marketplace.
Of the three government regulators described in the examples
above, one is a food regulator (FSANZ), one is an environmental safety
regulator (OGTR) and one has dual roles (CTNbio). Yet all used a priori
assumptions that they did not need to do a risk assessment of novel
dsRNA molecules, rather than requiring experimental evidence that
these molecules caused no adverse effects. In addition, a recent re-
view paper has also used a priori assumptions that did not capture
sequence-determined risks (Parrott et al., 2010) whereas a recent
conference that included industry participation did consider sequence-
determined risks when they acknowledged that the potential for
off-target effects was due to potential pairing between siRNA and
unintended transcripts of non-target genes (CERA, 2011). In contrast
to our ﬁndings, the conference concluded that existing safety evaluation
protocols were adequate for identifying all adverse effects from dsRNA.
However, the conference proceedings did not cite the high-proﬁleliterature on secondary dsRNAs (Pak and Fire, 2007; Sijen et al., 2007)
and the conference predated the conﬁrmation that dsRNAs could be
transmitted through food (Hirschi, 2012; Jiang et al., 2012; Zhang
et al., 2012a). These signiﬁcant omissionsmay have led to their different
conclusions about safety testing protocols.
There are two ways to apply assumption-based reasoning, or
“arguments of ignorance” (Cummings, 2010), under scientiﬁc uncer-
tainty. The ﬁrst way forms the basis of the examples in Section 2.
The second way is to avoid harm. When used to avoid harm,
assumption-based reasoning is internationally sanctioned as the
precautionary principal/approach. This approach sees the burden of
proof remainingwith the developer and the regulator before a potential
harm can be shifted to society. Precaution under uncertainty has a high
international normative standard of application, being recorded in the
Rio Declaration as “Where there are threats of serious or irreversible
damage, lack of full scientiﬁc certainty shall not be used as a reason
for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental
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ty count as serious? And even if the damage caused by an effect can
be fully healed, does that make any suffering at the time reversible?
There is a considerable amount of disagreement in the scientiﬁc
community on these sorts of normative judgements.3.2. Facing uncertainty in the risk assessment of dsRNA-based GM traits
There are scientiﬁcally accessible and demonstrated techniques to
address any absence of evidence about whether the existence of
unintended dsRNA molecules or unintended genomic modiﬁcations
arise from the use of novel siRNAs (Heinemann et al., 2011). However,
each of these techniques have ‘blind spots’, including limits of detection
that may be too high to ensure that not ﬁnding an siRNA is biologically
meaningful. Thus, other tests may still be warranted, such as in vitro
testing using tissue culture cells and proper animal experiments that
encompass all relevant exposure routes.
The ﬁrst step in a risk assessment is hazard identiﬁcation. When
this step fails, then the risk assessment fundamentally falters. The
examples in Section 2 describe not just how a risk was recognized
and then systematically denied, but inmany cases a refusal to acknowl-
edge that any risk existed at all.4. Recommended risk assessment
While it is clear that the regulatory framework for assessing the
risks of GM plants is evolving and responding to new information,
it is also clear that there is disagreement on when or how rapidly
an observed biological phenomenon relevant to a risk assessment
necessitates a regulator asking for experimental evidence to address
potential adverse effects. This has created a vacuum for the risk as-
sessment of dsRNAs unique to or at unique concentrations in GMOs.
To help ﬁll this vacuum, we consider the kinds of scientiﬁc studies or
assurances that could be undertaken to evaluate the safety of these
products.Fig. 3. Sequential approach to assessing the potential for adverse effects arising from dsRN
thetical targets of both intended and unintended dsRNAs so that potential adverse effects ca
the transcriptome level. Exposure analysis is used to design the appropriate kinds of orga
dsRNAs; (**) starting point for unintended changes to the transcriptome. Bioinformatics
made following exposure are based on data from experiments.4.1. Sequential approach
(1) Bioinformatics should be used to identify any likely, unintended
targets in humans and other critical organisms (e.g., plants, fungi,
animals, microbes) of the siRNAs intentionally produced by
the GM plant (Fig. 3). Such organisms should include species
that are used as indicators of key ecological functions or which
are protected. These studies would look for perfect sequence
matches or similar sequences both within outside of coding
regions, e.g., introns (Seinen et al., 2011), and perfect matches
in seed regions of 3′ UTRs, of RNAs derived from whole genome
sequences, where available. The algorithmsmust be able to iden-
tify short sequences of identity between the intended siRNA and
any potential target. If the comparison is restricted to an estimate
of overall similarity between the gene intended to be silenced
and other genes, then the short but biologically meaningful
matches may be overlooked (Birmingham et al., 2006; Chalk
and Sonnhammer, 2008; Scacheri et al., 2004). The siRNAs
chosen from this analysis would be those that are least likely to
create off-target effects.
(2) All new intended and unintended dsRNA molecules should be
identiﬁed in the GM product (Heinemann et al., 2011). Ideally,
this would be done through a semi-targeted qualitative proﬁling
of small RNA molecules using next generation sequencing in
a comparative assessment between the GM and conventional
parent (Heinemann et al., 2011).
The silencing pathway should be experimentally veriﬁed. The
experiments should be able to distinguish between a role for
cytoplasmic or nuclear (TGS) silencing pathways, and the contri-
bution of each to silencing. This is because the different pathways
may produce different off-target effects. This may require exam-
ining changes at the DNA level, such as changes in methylation.
If unintended novel dsRNAs are identiﬁed in the GM product,
bioinformatics should again be used to gauge the possibility of
any off-target effects from these dsRNAs.
(3) If no likely adverse effects are identiﬁed after step 2, then testing
should be conducted on animal and human cells in tissue culture,A-initiated modiﬁcations to organisms. Bioinformatics is used to capture known hypo-
n be assessed. Transcriptomics is used to verify and characterise all relevant changes at
nism-level tests for adverse effects. (*) Starting point for intentional introduction of
assessments are inferences or judgments made based on predictions. Assessments
53J.A. Heinemann et al. / Environment International 55 (2013) 43–55for example as done by Zhang et al. (2012a). dsRNAs extracted
from the GM product or from test animals exposed to the prod-
uct should be provided to the cells to monitor changes in gene
expression. Uptake by the cells should be conﬁrmed. If no
adverse effects are found in these assays, using a variety of differ-
ent tissue-speciﬁc cell types, then animal transcriptomeor prote-
ome changes should be monitored. If the intent is to assess
human safety outcomes, then animals with embedded patches
of human cells in the gastrointestinal tract would be preferred
(Xiang et al., 2006).
The use of semi-targeted qualitative proﬁling of small RNA mol-
ecules from the tissue culture cells, patches of human cells and
animals tested could also determine whether the effect of the
siRNAs was transferable. It would also reveal any generation of
unintended novel RNAs (Heinemann et al., 2011).
Although dsRNAs are intended to silence genes, they can also
activate genes, for example, when they silence a gene repressor.
Therefore, the GMproduct also should be evaluated for composi-
tional changes, anti-nutrients and new immunomodulating pro-
teins as would be done for any GM product with intentional
changes to the proteome.
(4) To speciﬁcally test for adverse effects on humans, more dedi-
cated testing would be needed. Long-term testing should be
conducted on at least two different animal species to fully test
for any unintended effects of the dsRNA and its associated GM
product (e.g., a GM plant). At least one of these animal species
should be a mammal, so that it has a comparable biology to
humans. The testing process should include all expected expo-
sure routes, e.g., ingestion, inhalation, which is a potential expo-
sure route (Renner et al., 2012), and contact via the skin. Feeding
studies should use both the intended dsRNA molecules and the
edible portion of the GM product.
The animal studies should include studies to investigatewhether
there are any toxic effects such as any damage to liver, kidneys,
or any other organ, any increased risk of any reproductive
problems (including to see if any dsRNA-related changes are
inherited) over at least two generations, and any increased
risk of cancer and any increased risk of an immune response
to the GM product, such as an allergic reaction.
When investigating toxic effects it is important that: (a) a con-
trol group of animals, fed the non-GMparental organism, is in-
cluded for comparison; (b) there are enough animals in eachBox 2
Should clinical testing be routine?
Shortly after the discovery of RNAi, new pharmaceuticals and vaccines
testing (Brisibe et al., 2003; Hirschi, 2012; Seyhan, 2011). Interestingly
full clinical safety and efficacy trials whereas any unintended silencing b
Regulators concerned by this difference in standards based on the inten
further testing beyond what is described in Section 4.
If animal studies fail to find any adverse effects and also demonstrate any
before the GM product comes into the human food supply, using the st
initial studies are done on a small number of volunteers to determine if th
the GM product has any beneficial health effects in Phase II. The part of
In Phase I of the clinical trial process, where adverse effects are investig
of the dsRNA into people, (2) any silencing of any genes in people, (3) a
organ, or (4) any increased risk of an immune response to the GM pro
When investigating toxic effects it is important that: (a) a control group of
is included for comparison; (b) there are enough people in each group to
e.g. 25 males and 25 females per dietary group; (c) people are fed for a
doses of the GM plant, including high doses; and (e) full biochemistry an
minimum requirement.group to derive a statistically signiﬁcant assurance of either
harm or safety, e.g., 25 male and 25 female animals per dietary
group for toxicity studies (for speciﬁc guidance of minimum
numbers of animals for various tests, see OECD guidance doc-
uments TG451, TG452 and TG453 and discussion in enHealth,
2012); (c) the animals are fed from the ages of just-weaned
and for at least six months (and preferably for the lifespan
of the animal species, particularly if carcinogenic outcomes
and/or life-long consequences of consuming dsRNA are being
evaluated); (d) sub-groups of animals are fed various doses of
the GM plant, including high doses; (e) full biochemistry and
hematology analyses on blood are done on every animal as a
minimum requirement (Séralini et al., 2009, 2012), with addi-
tional testing informed by earlier experiments; and (f) a full
autopsy is conducted on the animals at the end of the experi-
ment, which includes histology on all major organs.
Depending on the outcome of the experiments, further testing
may be required. It is noteworthy that dsRNAs intended for use
as human therapeutics or vaccines would probably require full
clinical testing. Therefore, it might be worthwhile to adopt simi-
lar testing for unintended effects of dsRNAs taken up through
food or exposure to food products (Box 2).
5. Summary
While some GMOs have been designed to make new dsRNA mol-
ecules, in other GMOs such molecules may occur as a side-effect of
the genetic engineering process. Still others may make naturally-
occurring dsRNA molecules in higher or lower quantities than before.
Some dsRNA molecules can have profound physiological effects on
the organism that makes them. Physiological effects are the intended
outcomes of exposure to dsRNA incorporated into food sources for
invertebrates; biopesticides and other topically applied products, and
could be the cause of off-target effects and adverse effects in non-
target organisms. “A daunting outcome is raised, that each [dsRNA]
formulation might have its own risks” (p. 514 Aronin, 2006).
Two separate studies have now provided evidence for miRNAs of
plant origin in the circulatory system or organs of humans or mammals
(Zhang et al., 2012a, 2012b). In addition, there is experimental evidence
demonstrating that some dsRNAmolecules can be transmitted through
food or other means and can affect those organisms through alterations
in gene expression (Zhang et al., 2012a).based on dsRNA molecules were proposed, with some rushed into
, any dsRNA intended to silence a gene for medical reasons requires
y a food-borne dsRNA requires no testing in some jurisdictions.
ded use, rather than unintended risk, of the product, may consider
putative benefit, clinical testing on humans could then be undertaken
andard phases of a clinical trial process (Carman, 2004). In Phase I,
ere are any adverse effects, before studies are done to determine if
the product that people eat should be used in these studies.
ated, the study should investigate whether there is: (1) any uptake
ny toxic effects such as any damage to liver, kidneys, or any other
duct, such as an allergic reaction.
people, fed the isogenic or near isogenic non-GMparental organism,
derive a statistically significant assurance of either harm or safety,
t least six months; (d) sub-groups of volunteers are fed with various
d hematology analyses on blood are done on every participant as a
54 J.A. Heinemann et al. / Environment International 55 (2013) 43–55Production of intended dsRNA molecules may also have off-target
effects due to silencing genes other than those intended. Unanticipated
off-target adverse effects can be difﬁcult to detect and they are not pos-
sible to reliably predict using bioinformatics techniques.
Regulatory bodies are not adequately assessing the risks of dsRNA-
producing GM products.
As a result, we recommend a process to properly assess the safety
of dsRNA-producing GM organisms before they are released or com-
mercialized (Fig. 3). This process includes the following: (1) bioinfor-
matics to identify any likely, unintended targets of the dsRNA in
humans and other key organisms; (2) experimental procedures that
would identify all new intended and unintended dsRNA molecules
in the GM product; (3) testing animal and human cells in tissue cul-
ture for a response to intended and unintended dsRNAs from the
product; (4) long-term testing on animals; and possibly (5) clinical
trials on human volunteers.
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